The US-made grand financial crisis is a natural experiment. We have witnessed the grand failure of the linear equilibrium theory of the efficient market and the emergence of the non-linear evolutionary theory of the viable market. Four observations reveal where the equilibrium theory of asset pricing and business cycles went wrong: the exchange rate resonance driven by US business cycles, the mesofoundation of macro-fluctuations, the endogenous nature of persistent cycles in financial and macro-indexes, and the trend collapse and higher moment risk in the derivatives market. The new perspective, which is analogous to the theory of nonlinear population dynamics in continuous time, provides a better alternative for understanding complex causes of the grand crisis, including systematic failure in the mortgage security market, unprecedented concentration in financial markets, unfettered speculation in commodity and currency markets, deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets. A new international financial order can be achieved if a robust international antitrust law is developed and applied, and a Tobin tax on foreign exchange transactions can be established through global efforts.
constructive role in developing Asian dollar market, Pacific Union, and new international order are discussed. An overhaul of financial theory is needed to develop a viable financial market to support sustainable economies.
Introduction
This ongoing grand crisis originated in the United States, then transmogrified into an international crisis. It represents a natural experiment. The positive side of this crisis is its fundamental lesson. It is not a theoretical debate confined to ivory towers, but a historical event that has destroyed social confidence in the mainstream equilibrium theory of the so-called efficient market. This has accelerated the rise of the non-linear evolutionary theory of the viable market. Four observations reveal where the equilibrium theory of asset pricing and business cycles went wrong: 1) exchange rate resonance driven by US business cycles; 2) the meso-foundation of macro-fluctuations; 3) the endogenous nature of persistent cycles in financial macroindexes; and 4) the trend of collapse and higher moment risk in the derivative market.
The new perspective of non-linear population dynamics in continuous time provides a better alternative to existing rational-actor/linear models of finance, not only for understanding the cause of the present situation, but to inform efforts related to redesign and reform. The systematic failure in the mortgage security market, unprecedented concentration in the international financial market, and unfettered speculation in the commodity and currency markets have all contributed to the current disaster. A new international financial order can be achieved if a robust and workable international antitrust law can be enacted and a Tobin tax on foreign exchange transactions can be established through global efforts. An overhaul of financial theory is needed to develop a viable market for sustainable economies.
Empirical observations and policy implications: econometric illusion in the efficient market and an alternative strategy for a viable market
Our empirical analysis of business cycles draws on tools developed by the new science of complexity and non-linear dynamics, which were applied to US economic time series (Chen 1988 (Chen , 1996a (Chen , 1996b (Chen , 2002 (Chen , 2006 (Chen , 2007 . The policy recommendations were reached based on alternative scenarios tested under the rubric of non-linear evolutionary dynamics in finance and economics (Chen 2005 (Chen , 2008 .
The debate begins by examining exchange rate co-movements and the nature of business cycles, before proceeding to examine the misleading role of linear models in asset pricing.
Exchange rate resonance among major currencies and a Tobin tax to discourage short-term speculation
What was the source of the US financial crisis? US Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, has attributed it to over-consumption in the United States and oversaving in China, while Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner, has blamed China's exchange rate policy. Is there any empirical evidence in the conventional arena predicting the unstable nature of the international financial market? Econometric tests based on regression analysis cannot reach a conclusion since their results depend on untenable assumptions about underlying dynamic structures. In contrast, our observations are based on non-parametric analysis of the currency depreciation pressure index (CDP), which is constructed in terms of covered interest rate parity (IRP). We can consider CDP as a disequilibrium measurement of the degree of deviation from IRP (Jia and Chen 2009) . We plot major currency trajectories over time (Figure 3.1) , including the euro, the Japanese yen, British pound sterling and the Chinese renminbi. Equilibrium theory asserts that an efficient market should be characterised by the absence of arbitrage opportunity. If equilibrium theory is valid in the international financial market, we should see horizontal lines in time, not wavelike resonance. Its relation with monetary instruments is shown in Figure 3 .2. (Jan.1999 -Feb.2009 ). Monthly data source is Bloomberg.com. CDP is constructed by covered interest rate parity in terms of three-month interest rates, forward and spot exchange rates. A clear pattern of wavelike co-movement can be observed.
The wave-like resonance patterns among the major-economy exchange rates in From Figure 3 .2, we can see clearly that only long-term interest rates signal the boom and bust in business cycles.
Based on the above observations, we see no evidence of an equilibrium-efficient market encapsulated in risk-free arbitrage in the currency market. Detailed studies show little correlation between exchange rate resonance and other fundamental variables in the US economy, such as trade and budget deficits. On the contrary, there is strong evidence of US power in the international market, since the exchange rate resonance is clearly driven by US business cycles. This implies that the US economy is the dominant market for international capital flow-which it is. No other currencies have countervailing power against the tide of the US economy. This implication is important for designing the new international financial order. Even if the US economy declines significantly, there is no candidate to replace the US dollar as the world's reserve currency in the near future.
Endogenous nature of US persistent business cycles and a new perspective on risk management
If the exchange rates of major countries are driven by US business cycles, the next question must be about the nature of business cycles. Are they generated by external shocks (Frisch 1933 , Lucas 1972 or by internal instability (Schumpeter 1939; Chen 1988 Chen , 1996a )? This issue is essential, since all textbook investment strategies related to diversification and hedging are based on a simple assumption that an efficient market is characterised by a random walk or Brownian motion, without countenancing the possibility of non-linear deterministic patterns such as persistent cycles and chaos (Friedman 1953; Fama 1970 Fama , 1991 Black and Scholes 1973) . The application of a new technique of time-frequency analysis based on WGQ (WignerGabor-Qian) transformation in time-frequency space has led to the development of a powerful tool for non-stationary time-series analysis, which can replace those conventional models (Chen 1996a (Chen ,b, 2005 (Chen , 2008 . Solid evidence of endogenous persistent cycles is shown in Figure 3 (Jan.1950 -Apr. 2009 ), data source is yahoo.finance. The upper diagram shows the original(the dotted line) and filtered (the solid line) HP cyclic time series. Y-ratio is the variance of the filtered time series to the variance of the the original one, which is 64.9% here. CC is their cross-correlation, which is 0.94 here. The lower diagram shows the time trajectory of the characteristic period of the HP cyclic series. The vertical axis is the period in years, the horizontal axis is time from 1950 to 2009. The period trajectory is more or less moving around the NBER business cycle frequency (Chen 1996b (Chen , 2005 .
As shown in Figure 3 .3, deterministic cycles can explain 64.9 per cent of variance from HP-detrended cycles filtered by WGQ transformation in time-frequency space.
The cross-correlation with original cycles is 0.94. We found these persistant cycles can be explained by color chaos. Color means that its intrinsic period is about 4 to 5 years. Color chaos is deterministic chaos in continous-time. Its correlation dimension is about 2.5 for S&P 500 index (Chen 2005) . Color chaos can be considered as the nonlinear oscillator model of Schumpeter's biological clock, a better alternative to random walk or white noise in equilibrium theory of business cycles. From Figure 3 .4, we may easily find out that FD filter is a whitening device, which suppresses low-frequency signals in business-cycle range but amplifies highfrequency noise (Chen 2008) . This is the central device in creating an equilibrium illusion of an 'efficient market' which is characterized by white noise or random walk in the Wall Street.
What can be learnt from these observations? First, white noise plays only a nondominant role in the financial market. For example, the white noise component represents only about 30 per cent of the variance of the HP-filtered S&P 500 cycles.
Second, the equilibrium theory of efficient markets provides a distorted image of reality. We find that the intrinsic frequency of stock market indexes is remarkably stable about the business-cycle frequency, while the price level varies erratically.
Therefore, price does not contain all the information about market movements.
Market trends, cyclical periods and correlation phases have more essential information than the price level for business decision-making and macromanagement. Third, the equilibrium theory of asset pricing offers a misleading recipe for risk management. A diversification strategy works only if market movements have no systematic trends or persistent cycles, and all players make independent rational decisions without correlated actions. If business cycles play a leading role in market movements, cash-flow management should be the key factor in risk management-a fact that is often missing from traditional asset-pricing theory. Investors do not just make a simple choice between stocks and bonds. Cash can become king when uncertainty is pervasive. That is why securitisation is not capable of preventing crises such as the sub-prime debacle. On the contrary, complex tools of derivative trading amplify market resonance under the guidance of equilibrium finance theory. 1.4 9000 S&P 500 Index 1.6 5000 NASDAQ 2.0 3000 Japan-US exchange rate 6.1 300 US-Euro exchange rate (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) 4.9 400 Texas crude oil price 5.3 400
Notes: For non-stationary time series, market variability is measured via the HP filter; the average is estimated from a moving time window in the range of the average length of business cycles, here is five years (Chen 2002). Data sources: US aggregate indexes and exchange rates are sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank at St Louis; stock indexes data are from <yahoo.finance>; the oil price index is from the US Energy Information Administration.
The numbers of households, corporations and public companies and their implied orders of market variation (MV) in 1980 are given in Table 3 .2. a Here, we count only those corporations with more than $100 000 in assets.
The data source is the U.S. Bureau of Census.
From Tables 3.1 per cent of oil contracts in the future markets were controlled by speculative capital at the peak. In the past five years, hedge funds and global banks have poured capital into the oil market. Their 'investment' rose from $13 billion to $300 billion. Something must be done to stabilise commodity future markets.
Rethinking the theoretical foundation of trend collapse, higher moment risk and the financial crisis in the derivatives market
In the 2008 financial crisis, credit default swaps (CDS) played an important role when the fall of Lehman Brothers generated a tremendous loss for AIG. We suspect that the oversimplified model of CDS options based on orthodox pricing theory played a significant role in ignoring underlying market instability.
An important discovery related to the principle of large numbers is the viable dynamics for sustainable markets. For the representative agent model of geometric Brownian motion, the probability of stock-price movement can be simplified to a binomial tree (Cox et al. 1979) . Credit default swap valuation is also based on a similar model (Duffie 1999 ). For our model in the birth-death process, stock-price changes can be understood by a trend-based trinomial tree, in addition to the probability of prices moving up and down, there is a chance of a stable price. This complexity might exhibit the so-called volatility smile (changing market volatility driven by irrational herd behaviour in financial market) observed in option prices. It is possible to modify the option-pricing model based on the population model of a nonlinear birth-death process in stock-price movements, which is capable of explaining volatility smile and existing modified models of option pricing (Zeng and Chen 2008) . A more general model of evolution in probability distribution can be derived in terms of a master equation (Tang and Chen 2009 ).
Based on empirical observations, transition probability can be described by a nonlinear function; its solution can be approximated by expansion in terms of higher moments. If we consider only the first and second moments (i.e. mean and variance in portfolio theory), the solution will converge to that of the Black-Scholes model, in which an arbitrage-free portfolio can be constructed. If, however, we add the third, fourth moments or higher, the model solution might produce explosive patterns, such as a trend collapse and market crisis (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). In other words, financial crisis can be understood as explosive higher moment risk. The high moments (cumulants) have infinite terms in theory. In practice, we only need finite moments from the empirical data in Figure 3 .5 for economic analysis. We select the 2-5th moments here for understanding historical events (Table 3. 3). 
Economic complexity of transaction costs and the selective mechanism of industrial organisation
The US Administration has long realised the critical role of prudent financial regulation. Mainstream economists, however, still argue that the market can be self-regulating; following the Coase theory of transaction costs. Coase (1937) claimed that the foundation of the firm was the incentive to reduce transaction costs. Coase (1960) believed that social conflicts could be solved via bilateral exchange without interference from a third intermediary such as government or legal action. Coase (1988) assumed that the US financial market was an ideal model of the Coasian world of zero transaction costs. He seemingly ignored the fact that regulating the financial market greatly increased transaction costs. Coase (1979) raised the issue when he openly placed doubts on anti-bribery legislation for the media industry. He simply ignored the social costs that emerged when bribery and market manipulation generated system instability, which could potentially cost much more than regulation.
The real aim of the Coase theory was to reject antitrust policy when he met the Chicago School (Kitch 1983) . This study revives the old debate about antitrust policy from the new perspective of market instability and economic complexity. On the contrary, we have solid evidence supporting the Austrian theory of endogenous money. In 1998, China had to confront severe deflation in the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis. China managed to maintain sustained growth mainly through fiscal policy-manifest in large investments on infrastructure. So far, we already see that the effectiveness of monetary policy is highly constrained by historical policy and economic structure. When the business sector is heavily in debt, expansionary monetary policy can move only short-term interest rates and might be powerless to determine medium and long-term interest rates when investors feel uncertain about the economic outlook due to the danger of deep recession, possible inflation and currency depreciation. Since late 2008, major countries have rapidly adopted crisis policies including monetary expansion, fiscal stimulus and enhancing regulation in the financial market, such as over executive pay and leverage restriction.
From our observation, the US Administration has tried only to treat the symptoms rather than to cure the American disease, which is the huge power of the financial sector to crowd out the industrial sector. So far, we see no attempt by policymakers to break up monopolistic financial firms such as AIG and Citibank. Thinking strategically, we should prepare for the worst scenario and then work out the best solution.
Kindleberger ( The best-case scenario is that current globalisation can be stabilised. This is possible only if trust in security matters and financial coordination can be consolidated among the major military and economic powers, including the United States, the European Union, China, Russia and Japan. The Cold War did not turn into a 'hot war' since the Yalta bipolar structure was stable during the Cold War era. Since the Soviet Union dissolved, the unipolar structure based on US dominance is significantly unstable in a world of disequilibrium with increasing disparity between rich and poor countries.
The American disease and the China puzzle
Before discussing China's role, we need to understand the world today from an evolutionary perspective. Bernanke once suggested that the US imbalance was rooted not in excess consumption but in China's excess saving. I have a different view on this. The United States is much more powerful than China and the other Asian economies combined. Its financial power still dominates the international financial order-as we already know from the foregoing discussion.
The United States' trouble in the financial markets began with former President Ronald Reagan's contradictory economic policies in the 1980s. On the one hand,
Reagan launched a tremendous military expansion; on the other hand, he provided substantial tax cuts and deregulated the financial sector. Growing public debt financed the budget deficit that resulted, which drove up interest rates and the dollar, and ruined the competitiveness of the US manufacturing industry. As we know, the response to this was outsourcing-first to Japan and then to East Asia. The United
States pushed Japan to appreciate the yen, but that did not solve its trade deficit.
Instead, it threw the manufacturing industry out of Japan and to the 'Asian tigers' and mainland China. The United States has been putting pressure on the Chinese Government to appreciate its currency again, but without much success.
The United States' fundamental problem is that the financial sector has replaced the industrial sector as the driver of its economy. You cannot cure that disease by playing currency or monetary games. Since the 1970s, no matter how the exchange rate has fluctuated, the United States has had a persistent trade deficit, while Germany and Japan have had a persistent trade surplus. This has nothing to do with exchange rates, but with US policy. The United States has advanced technology and abundant resources, but continues to waste immense resources on military spending and financial speculation. What is needed is a fundamental change in its policy framework.
As for China, of course it has suffered from US foreign policy, but it has also benefited. During the East Asian financial crisis, China followed the United States' recommendation that it should not devalue its currency. Before and during that crisis, What, however, are the real results of this policy? After the East Asian financial crisis, all these countries realised that China was a more reliable partner in international trade than previously thought, since China did not devalue its currency despite the crisis. They also realised that their economies benefited greatly from China's rapid growth. So, geopolitically speaking, these countries went from being insecure neighbours to Chinese partners. South Korea, the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and Vietnam, in addition to Hong Kong and Taiwan, became increasingly integrated in the rapidly growing Chinese economy.
Today, East Asia is the third-largest economic zone in the world, with relatively stable exchange rates to the dollar, which also helps to stabilise the US currency. If US policymakers realise that this can be the basis for closer economic cooperation, I
would say that our future is bright. If, however, the United States considers this as a challenge rather than an opportunity, it signals a troubling future. This is the geopolitical heritage of the Reagan regime and the US imbalance. So far, the United States is still able to maintain its financial power in spite of increasing deficits. One critical factor in this is China's exchange rate policy. So far, both
Chinese and Americans are happy about the past but worry about the future. Unlike her Asian partners, China does not get any credit from US policymakers. Perhaps the United States should think about how to win other people's trust rather than just other people's money.
We need to explain one of the 'China puzzles': why China has a much higher saving rate than industrialised countries-or why do poor countries end up subsidising the rich ones such as the United States? Some Western observers speculated that China's rapid growth was not based on technological progress and organisational innovation but on suppressing workers' wages and thus household consumption. Since China launched its reforms some 30 years ago, its annual growth rate in residential income and consumption has been about 7 and 6 per cent, respectively.
China's high-saving puzzle cannot be explained by households; it has to do with the behaviour of firms. If we look at the composition of China's immense bank deposits, 
China's realistic role in a changing world order
There is much debate about China's role in a changing world order-from the 'China threat' to 'G2' status. As a personal observation, China's success is based on a decentralised experiment in searching for a Chinese model of global competition.
There are several features of the Chinese system that are different from mainstream economics based on the Anglo-Saxon model-so-called laissez-faire economics.
First, China has been a unified country since 200 BC-formed not by market forces but by political organisation based on a small-scale, self-sufficient economy.
China has only 10 per cent arable land, and has experienced frequent wars and natural disasters. Historically, there has been persistent demand for effective governments rather than small governments. China developed resource-saving but labourconsuming technology while the West developed labour-saving but resourceconsuming technology under different ecological conditions (Chen 1990 (Chen , 1993 Reserve printed too much money, thereby destabilising the global economy, higher uncertainty would raise interest rates in both the euro and Asian dollar markets.
Market forces would effectively discipline central bankers if their monetary policy was irresponsible or near-sighted. Goodwill alone is not a sufficient condition for a sound international order. International competition is a necessary condition for international stability.
Third, China's recent investment in foreign natural resources has caused a series of public relations problems since China's operation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
is not compatible with Western laws. China should learn from the US model of landgrant universities and non-profit university endowment funds, rather than the Singaporean model of sovereign wealth funds. SOEs transformed into publicly listed, shareholder companies owned by university funds, pension funds, and so on, would greatly improve China's image abroad and its educational foundation at home.
Currently, China's technological attainment depends heavily on foreign technology.
China's higher education system is essentially a teaching rather than a research system. By dividing state assets among a dozen or so competitive 'land-grant' university endowment funds, China could build up a strong system of innovation by integrating research, education and production. 
Basic considerations in reforming the international financial market
Based on the above discussion, there are some basic considerations for reforming the international financial market.
First, current economic and financial bureaucracies are heavily influenced by equilibrium economists and financial interests. It would be helpful to establish a nongovernmental expert forum under the United Nations; their policy recommendations could be more constructive for discussions among world leaders.
Second, regulation and supervision should centre on an international competition or antitrust policy. The market shares of giant financial companies in the commodity market, currency market and some key financial sectors should be subject to an upper limit, such as 5 per cent. Trading volume should be monitored frequently and transactions above a certain threshold should be reported and regulated.
Third, a Tobin tax on currency exchanges is essential to protect small countries without large amounts of foreign reserves. Tobin tax receipts should be housed in a specific development fund for helping developing countries.
Fourth, each country has the sovereign right to match its exchange rate regime to its development stratagem. Its exchange rate can be used in SDR (Special Drawing Rights, an international reserve asset created by IMF) calculations with gradual adjustment every five years or so. An economic council under the United Nations, which is responsible for coordinating major countries in stabilising their exchange rates, could regulate the International Monetary Fund (IMF). An orderly adjustment of exchange rates could be conducted every five years or so except in emergency situations.
Fifth, an overhaul of financial theory and financial regulation would speed up the academic debate about rethinking economic history and theory (Chen 2008 , Lin 2009 ). This conference on China's new place in a world in crisis is a small step towards this direction.
Let us work together for a better world.
